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Abstract

We construct a model that combines elements of endogenous growth with the
convergence implications of the neoclassical growth model. In the long run, the world
growth rate is driven by discoveries in the technologically leading economies. Followers
converge toward the leaders because copying is cheaper than innovation over some
range. A tendency for copying costs to increase reduces followers' growth rate and
thereby generates a pattern of conditional convergence. We discuss how countries are
selected to be technological leaders; and we assess welfare implications. Poorly defined
intellectual property rights imply that leaders have insufficient incentive to invent and
followers have excessive incentive to copy.
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In the neoclassical growth model, per capita output grows in the long run only
because of exogenous technological progress. The interesting insights about growth
involve the convergence behavior along the transition path. Because of diminishing
returns to capital, economies grow faster when they start further below their steady
state positions. Thus, if the determinants of the steady-st ate positions are held fixed,
then poorer places are predicted to grow faster in per capita terms. 1 This result--o ften
described as conditional convergence--receives strong empirical support if the variables
held constant include aspects of government policy. 2
The recent endogenous growth theory, initiated by Romer (1987, 1990) and
extended by Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chs. 3, 4) and Aghion and Howitt (1992),
explains long-term growth from a model of technological progress. The private research
that underlies commercial discovery is motivated along Schumpeterian lines by the flow
of profit that accrues to an innovator. Since the profit flow depends on some form of
monopoly power, the resulting equilibrium tends not to be Pareto optimal.
The strong point of the recent theories is that they endogenize the rate of technical
change, a variable that is unexplained in the neoclassical growth model. Thus, the long
term growth rate becomes an endogenous variable that depends on the underlying
parameters and disturbances in the model. However, the new theories are less attractiv e
in that they tend to lose the prediction of conditional convergence.
The present analysis links the long-term growth implications of the recent theories
with the convergence implications of the neoclassical growth model. In the long run,
growth depends on the discovery of new products or technologies in a few leading

1The main references for the neoclassical model are Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956), Swan
(1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965). For an exposition, see Barro and
Sala-i-M artin (1995, Chs. 1,2).
2see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-M artin (1995, Ch. 12). This kind of empirical analysis
also holds constant the initial stocks of human capital in the forms of education and health.
These stocks affect an economy's rate of convergence to the steady state; see Mulligan and
Sala-i-M artin (1993), Caballe and Santos (1993), and Barro and Sala-i-M artin (1995,
Ch. 5).
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economies. The rates of invention and growth reflect the forces described by Romer
(1990).
For the behavior across economies, the key element is that imitation is typically
cheaper than invention. Most countries therefore prefer to copy rather than invent.
Moreover, the relatively low cost of imitation implies that the typical follower grows
relatively fast and tends to catch up to the leaders. (This result holds in a conditional
sense; that is, for given government policies and other variables that affect the return
from the introduction of new technologies.) As the pool of copiable material decreases,
the costs of imitation tend to rise and the follower's growth rate tends to fall. Hence, a
pattern of conditional convergence emerges in this model of the diffusion of technology.
This similarity with the neoclassical model applies because the increasing cost of
imitation is analogous to the diminishing returns to capital.
In the long run, all economies grow at the rate of discovery in the leading places.
Thus, the rate of discovery plays the role in this model that the exogenous rate of
technical change plays in the neoclassical model. The comparison of growth rates across
countries reflects the conditional convergence behavior related to the costs of copying
inventions. Thus, the cross-country implications are similar to those of the neoclassical
model.

I. Setup of the Model
There are two countries, denoted by i=l,2. The production function in each
country is of the Spence (1976)/Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type:
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where O<a<l, Y. is output, L. is labor input, X.. is the quantity employed of the jth
1
1
IJ
type of nondurable intermediate good, and Ni is the number of types of intermediates
available in country i. The technology shown in equation (1) can be accessed by all
agents in country i, and production occurs under competitive conditions. The output in
country 1 is physically the same as that in country 2. The total quantities of labor in
each country, L and L , are constants.
1
2
The productivity parameter, Ai' can represent variations across countries in the
level of technology; that is, differences in output that arise for given values of Ni, Li,
and the X .. 's. In practice, however, the main source of differences in the A. is likely to
~
1

be variations in government policies, as reflected in infrastructure services, tax rates, the
degree of maintenance of property rights, and the rule of law. The effects of these
policies on outcomes are analogous to those from pure differences in the levels of
technology. Thus, the measures of government policy used in empirical studies, such as
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 12), are empirical counterparts of the Ar
Trade is assumed to be balanced between the two countries; that is, domestic
output, Yi' equals total domestic expenditures. These expenditures are for
consumption, Ci, production of intermediates, Xij' and R&D aimed at learning about
new varieties of intermediates. An agent can learn by inventing a new type of good or
by imitating a product that is known in the other country.
Units of Ci or Xij each require one unit of Yr The invention of a new variety of
product requires a lump-sum outlay of 77i units of Yr The assumed constancy of 77i
means that the returns from the discovery of new types of products are constant. One
reason that diminishing returns may not apply, offered by Romer (1993), is that the
world may possess an infinite number of potentially useful ideas. In this case, increases
in cumulated knowledge need not exhaust the opportunities for further learning. In
addition, past learning may make future learning easier, a force that could create
increasing returns (as well as possible externalities). In any event, the main results
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about the diffusion of technology would not change if discoveries of new types of
products did not involve precisely constant returns. The costs of imitation are
considered later.
Suppose, to begin, that country 1 is the technological leader, whereas country 2 is
the follower. Specifically, N1(0) > N2(0), and all of the varieties of intermediates known
initially in country 2 are also known in country 1. Assume, for now, that all discoveries
of new types of products occur in country 1. Country 2 imitates the intermediate goods
known in country 1 but does not invent anything.

II. Innovation in Country 1
The setup for country 1 is similar to that described in Romer (1990), Rivera-Batiz
and Romer (1991 ), Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 3), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995, Ch. 6). An inventor of an intermediate of type j is assumed to retain a perpetual
monopoly over the use of this good for production in country 1. (It is straightforward to
allow the good to become competitive with an exogenous probability p per unit of time.)

If intermediate j is priced in country 1 at P lj' then the flow of monopoly profit to the
inventor is

(2)

where the 1 inside the parentheses represents the marginal cost of production for the
intermediate.
The production function in equation (1) implies that the marginal product of
intermediate j in the production of output is

5

The equation of this marginal product to Plj yields the demand function for
intermediate j from all producers of goods in country 1:

(3)

Substitution of the result for

x 1j into equation (2) and maximization of 1r1j with

respect to P lj yields the monopoly price:

(4)

The monopoly price is the same at all points in time and for all types of intermediates.
The result in equation (4) implies that the total quantity produced of
intermediate j in country 1 is

(5)

Xlj -_ X1 -_ L1 . A11/(1-a). ...."'2/(1-a) ·

This quantity is the same for all intermediates j and at all points in time (because 1 is
1
constant). Substitution of the result from equation (5) into the production function in
equation (1) implies that country l's total output is

(6)

Y1 -_ A11/(1-a). a 2a/(1-a). 1 1N1·

Hence, output per person, y :Y /L , rises with the productivity parameter, Al' and the
1 1 1
number of varieties, N . The variable N represents the state of technology in
1
1
country 1. Increases in N lead to equiproportionate expansions in output per worker.
1
Substitution from equations (4) and (5) into equation (2) implies that the flow of
monopoly profit to the owner of the rights to intermediate j is

6

Since the profit fl.ow is constant, the present value of profits from date t onward is

where r (v) is the real interest rate at time v in country 1.
1
If there is free entry into the R&D business and if the equilibrium quantity of
R&D is nonzero at each point in time, then V (t) must equal the constant cost of
1
invention, 171' at each point in time. This condition implies that r (v) is constant over
1
time and given by

(8)

where 1r1 is given in equation (7). The rate of return, rl' is the ratio of the profit fl.ow,
1rl' to the lump-sum cost, 171' of obtaining this profit fl.ow.
Consumers in country 1 are of the usual Ramsey type with infinite horizons. At
time O, these consumers seek to maximize

(9)

where p>O is the rate of time preference and O>O is the magnitude of the elasticity of
the marginal utility of consumption. (The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
1/ 0.) The number of consumers-that is, population-is constant over time.
Maximization of utility, subject to a standard budget constraint, leads to the usual
formula for the growth rate of consumption:

7

(10)

Since r is constant from equation (8), the growth rate of c is also constant.
1
1
In the full equilibrium of this model, N and Y always grow at the same rate as
1
1
c1 (see Barro and Sala-i-Marti n [1995, Ch. 6]). If 1 denotes this common growth
1
rate, then

(11)

where

1 is given in equation (7). Thus, all of the quantities in country I-including
the number of known products, N -grow at the constant rate 1 . The parameters are
1
1
assumed to be such that 1 ~0 holds in equation (11); that is, 1r /.,, ~ p applies.
1
1 1
Otherwise, the solution would violate the constraint that N cannot be decreasing, and
1
1r

the free-entry condition for R&D would not hold with equality. 3 Since 1 is constant,
1
equation (6) shows that growth of N at the rate 1 is consistent with growth of Y at
1
1
1
the rate 11.

m.

Imitation in Country 2

A. Setup of the Model

The form of the production function, equation (1), is the same in country 2 as in
country 1. Country 2 is technologically behind initially in the sense that N (0)<N (0).
2
1
The parameters A and 1 and the innovation cost .,, may differ from their
2
2
2
counterparts in country 1. The copying and adaptation of one of country 1's
intermediates for use in country 2 requires a lump-sum outlay v (t), where v (0)<'f/ , so
2
2
2
that imitation is initially more attractive than innovation for country 2.
3The

transversality condition must also hold. This condition requires r >11' which entails
1
p > (1-0) · 1r / .,, . Hence, the transversality condition must be satisfied if 0~ 1.
1 1

8

Since the cost of innovation is constant, the discoveries of new types of products do
not encounter diminishing returns. As mentioned before, this assumption can be
rationalized from the idea that the number of potential inventions is unbounded.
Imitation differs from innovation in that the number of goods that can be copied
at any point in time is limited to the finite number that have been discovered elsewhere.
Specifically, country 2 can select for imitation only from the uncopied subset of the N
1
goods that are known in country 1. As N increases relative to N , the cost of imitation
2
1
is likely to rise. This property would hold, for example, if the products known in
country 1 varied in terms of how costly they were to adapt for use in country 2. The
goods that were easier to imitate would be copied first, and the cost v that applied at
2
the margin would increase with the number already imitated. This property is captured
here by assuming that v is an increasing function of N /N :
2
2 1

(12)

where v 1 >0. 4
2
For N2/N <1, the imitation cost v tends to be less than T/ because copying is
1
2
2
typically cheaper than discovery. But v can exceed T/ when N /N < 1 if the remaining
2
2
2 1
pool of uncopied inventions comprises goods that are difficult to adapt to country 2's
environment. In other words, it would be cheaper in some circumstances for a
technological follower to start from scratch rather than adapt one of the leader's goods.
Figure 1 shows, however, a simpler case in which v (N /N )<TJ applies for N /N <1
2 2 1
2
2 1
and v2(N 2/N ) approaches T/ as N /N approaches 1. The main results still hold if
2
1
2 1
v2(N 2/N 1)>TJ2 holds for a range of values N /N <l.
2 1
4This

formulation assumes that v , which represents the cost of copying the marginal good,
2
depends only on the state variable N / N . A more complicated approach would treat the
2 1
cost of copying a newly discovered product as a random draw from some probability
distribution.

9

Suppose that an agent in country 2 pays v (t) to imitate the jth variety of
2
intermediate from country 1. We assume that this agent retains a perpetual monopoly
right over the use of the intermediate for production in country 2. s The monopoly price
is then P j=P =1/ a, the same as that for country 1 in equation (4). The formulas for
2
2
quantity produced, x j, total output, Y , and flow of profit, 1r j, therefore parallel the
2
2
2
expressions for country 1 from equations (5)-{7):

The ratio of the per-worker products, yi' for the two countries is

(16)

Thus, the ratio depends on the relative value of the productivity parameters, A / A ,
2 1
and on the relative value of the number of known varieties of intermediates, N /N .
2 1
The corresponding ratio for the profit flows, 1r /1r , depends on A /A and also on
2 1
2 1
L2/L1.
The effect from the relative labor endowments is a scale benefit. The relevant
scale variable is the total of complementary factor input, Li, that the intermediates
work with in country i. Market size, per se, does not matter in this model because final
5Producers

in country 2 are assumed to be unable to circumvent the local monopoly by
importing intermediate good j from country 1. Even if this intermediate could be
purchased from abroad at a price below the monopoly level, the idea is that someone must
make the lump-sum outlay v to learn how to use the good effectively in the environment
2
of country 2.

10

goods are homogeneous and tradable internationally. The scale benefit from Li arises
because the cost of invention or imitation is assumed to be a lump-sum amount for the
entire economy (country 1 or country 2).6
The present value of profits from imitation of intermediate j in country 2 is

(17)

where r (v) is the rate of return in country 2 at time v. A gap in rates of return
2
between the two countries, riv)# , is possible because international lending has been
1
ruled out. 7 If there is free entry into the imitation business in country 2 and if the
equilibrium amount of resources devoted to imitation is nonzero at each point in time,
then V (t) must equal the cost of imitation, vit), at each point in time:
2

(18)

Substitution of the formula for V (t) from equation (17) and differentiation of
2
both sides of equation (18) with respect tot yields

(19)

6Becker and Murphy (1992), Quah (1994), and Alesina and Spolaore (1995) assume that
increases in scale also entail costs. These costs involve coordination among agents, the
processing of ideas, and heterogeneity in the preferences for public goods. In these settings,
a group or country tends to have an optimal size, and an increase in scale beyond this point
does not convey a net benefit.
7If international lending were permitted, then all current investment would flow to the R&D
activity that offers the highest rate of return. Investments in more than one kind of R&D
could coexist if the model were modified to include an inverse relation between the rate of
return to R&D and the current amount of R&D spending.

11

Hence, if v2 were constant, then r 2 would be constant and equal to 1r2/v2, the ratio of
profit to the lump-sum cost of obtaining this profit. This result would parallel the
formula for r 1 in equation (8). However, if v2 varies over time, then r 2 includes the
capital-gain term, v2/v 2 . With free entry, the monopoly right over an intermediate
good must equal the cost of obtaining it, v2. If v2 is rising (because N2/N 1 is increasing
in equation [121), then the expanding value of the monopoly right implies a capital gain
at the rate v2/v2. This gain adds to the "dividend rate," 1r2/v2, to get the full rate of
return in equation (19).
Consumers in country 2 are assumed to maximize Ramsey utility functions of the
form specified in equation (9). Therefore, the growth rate of c2 is related to r 2 in the
usual way:

(20)

This result parallels the one for country 1 in equation (10). The preference parameters,
p and 0, are assumed to be the same in the two countries.

B. Steady-State Growth
In the steady state, N2 grows at the same rate, 'Yl' as N1' so that v2 remains
constant in accordance with equation (12). The ratio N2/N 1 therefore equals a
constant, denoted (N 2/N 1)*. Assume for now that the parameters are such that
O<(N 2/N 1)*<1. The subsequent analysis relates this inequality to the parameters Ai'
and T/··l
L.,
l
In the steady state, the growth rates of Y2 and c 2 equal the growth rate of N2 ,
which equals -y1. Therefore, the steady-state growth rates of all the quantities in
*
country 2, denoted by -y2, equal -y1.

12

Since c2 and c grow in the long run at the rate 1 and since the preference
1
1
parameters, p and 0, are the same in the two countries, equations (8), (10), and (20)
imply

(21)

where 1r1 is given in equation (7). Thus, although the two countries do not share a
common capital market, the adjustment of N /N to the value (N /N )*-which
2 1
2 1
ensures 12*=1 -implies r *=r . In the long run, the process of technological diffusion
1
2 1
equalizes the rates of return.
*
Since r 2=r , equations (19) and (8) imply
1

*

where v2 is the steady-state value of v . The formulas for the profit flows from
2
equations (15) and (7) therefore imply

The assumption, thus far, is that country 2 never chooses to innovate. This
behavior is optimal for agents in country 2 if v (t)<77 applies along the entire path.
2
2
Since v2 is an increasing function of N2/N , the required condition (if N /N starts
1
2 1
*
below its steady-state value) is 112<11 , which implies from equation (22)
2

(23)

13

In other words, country 2 has to be intrinsically inferior to country 1 in terms of the
indicated combination of productivity parameters, A2/ Al' labor endowments, L2/Ll'
and costs of innovating, 111/112. If the inequality in (23) holds, then country 2 never has
an incentive to innovate (because v2[t]<¾ applies throughout). Moreover, country 1
never has an incentive to imitate, because there never exists a pool of foreign goods to
copy. Thus, if the inequality in (23) holds, then the equilibrium is the one already
described in which country 1 is the perpetual leader and country 2 is the perpetual
follower. We discuss in a later section the results when (23) does not hold.
Suppose now that the function for the cost of imitation in equation (12) takes the
constant-elasticity form:

(24)

for N2/N 19, where u>O. Note that v2 approaches¾ as (N 2/N 1) approaches 1, the
property assumed in Figure 1. The form in equation (24) is especially convenient for the
dynamic analysis.
Equations (22) and (24) imply that the steady-state ratio of N2 to N is given by
1

The inequality in (23) implies (N 2/N )*<1.
1
Since (N 2/N 1)*<1, equation (16) implies that y2 remains below y in the steady
1
state if A2~A 1. (Note that A2>A 1 can be consistent with the inequality in [23] if
L2<L 1 or 112>111.) Thus, the follower country's per-worker output js likely to fall short
of the leader's per-worker output even in the steady state. The potential to imitate
therefore does not generally provide a strong enough force to equalize the levels of per
worker product in the long run.

14

Consumption,

c 2, grows in the steady state at the constant rate 'Yp and the ratios

C /Y and c /N remain constant. The levels of these ratios in the steady state can be
2 2
2 2
ascertained from country 2's budget constraint: c equals total output, Y {from
2
2
equation [14]), less the goods devoted to production of intermediates, N X {where X is
2 2
2
given in equation [13]), less the resources expended on imitation. The last amount is

.

*

v2N , which equals v -y N in the steady state. This budget condition can be used to
2
2 1 2
determine (C /N )* and, hence, {C /Y )*.
2 2
2 2

C. The Dynamic Path and Convergence
The dynamic behavior for country 2 can be studied by considering differential
equations for the variables

c2 and N2.

(Since Y is proportional to N , from equation
2
2
[14], the dynamics of Y are the same as those of N .) For tractability, the analysis
2
2
uses the constant-elasticity form of the cost function from equation {24). The
parameters are also assumed to satisfy the inequality in {23), so that 11*<7'/ and
2 2
{N2 /N 1)*<1, as shown in Figure 1.
One differential equation comes from the formula for consumption growth in
equation (20), together with the expressions for the rate of return, r , from equation
2
{19) and the cost of imitation, 11 , from equation (24). It is convenient to define the
2
A

variable N:N /N , which will be constant in the steady state. 8 The formula for
2 1
consumption growth can then be expressed as

(26)

8This

construction effectively filters out the growth of N at the constant rate -y from the
1
1
solution for the growth rate of N . The growth rate 1 plays a role for country 2 that is
2
1
analogous to that of exogenous technological progress in the neoclassical growth model.
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As mentioned before, the change in N is determined by the budget constraint:
2
the resources devoted to imitation in country 2 equal total output, Y (equation [14]),
2
less consumption, c , less the quantity of intermediates, N X (where x is given in
2 2
2
2
equation [13]). The change in N2 equals l/11 times the resources devoted to imitation,
2
and the growth rate of N equals the growth rate of N minus 1 . The resulting formula
1
2
A

for the growth rate of N is

(27)

where the new variable,

will be constant in the steady state. Since Y is proportional to N (equation [14]),

2
is proportional to the consumption-output ratio, C /Y . 9
2 2

2

x2

Substitution for N/N from equation (27) into equation (26) yields an expression for
•

A

C2/C 2 in which the only right-hand side variables are N and Xf

Equations (27) and (28) imply that the growth rate of x :C /N is
2 2 2

9Equations (13) and (14) imply that value added (output net of intermediates), Y -N X ,
2 2 2
is proportional to N2 . Therefore x is also proportional to the ratio of c to value added.
2
2
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Equations (27) and (29) form a system of autonomous differential equations in the
A

variables N and

x2.

The steady state of this system has already been discussed in the

previous section. The dynamics can be described by means of a standard twoA

dimensional phase diagram in (N,x2) space.
A

A

Equation (27) implies that the locus for N=0 is downward sloping in (N,x2) space,
as shown in Figures 2 and 3. (Recall that 112 is an increasing function of N from
A

equation [24].) Equation (27) also implies that the N=0 locus is stable; that is, an
A

A

increase in N reduces N in the neighborhood of the locus.
Equation (29) implies that the slope of the x2 =0 locus depends on the sign of 0-u.
If 0> u, then the locus is upward sloping, as shown in Figure 2. This locus is unstable;
that is, an increase in

x raises

X·

The directions of motion are shown by arrows for the four regions in Figure 2. The
only path that avoids unstable behavior of N and x2 is the stable, saddle path, shown by
the dashed arrows. 10 If country 2 begins with N(0)<N*, then N and x2 each rise
A

A

A

monotonically toward their steady-state values.
Figure 3 deals with the case in which O<u. Equation (29) implies that the

x2=0

locus is now downward sloping and stable. (We can show that the slope of this locus is
A

always steeper in magnitude than that of the N=0 locus.) The key finding is that the
stable, saddle path is again upward sloping; that is, N and x2 still rise monotonically
during the transition from N(0)<N*.11
A

A

1°The unstable paths can be ruled out as equilibria as in the neoclassical growth model (see
Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995, Ch. 2]). One new element in the present model is that N
2
cannot decline if people cannot forget how to use a class of intermediate goods in
production. The analogue in the neoclassical model is that gross investment cannot be
negative; that is, the fall in the capital stock cannot exceed depreciation.

11If O=u, then the x =0 locus is vertical. The stable, saddle-path is again upward sloping in
2
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A

Since

x2 and N rise monotonically toward their steady-state values, equation (27)

implies that N/N falls monotonically toward its steady-state value, 0. (The monotonic
A

rise of N implies a monotonic increase in v .) Thus, during the transition, N grows
2
2
faster than N --imitation is proportionately greater than innovation-but the growth
1
rate of N falls steadily toward that of N . In the steady state, the rates of imitation
2
1
A

and innovation occur at the same rate, 'Yl' and N:N /N remains constant.
2 1
The follower's growth rate slows down during the transition because the imitation
cost, v , steadily increases. This increase in v represents a form of diminishing returns,
2
2
in this case to imitation. In the standard neoclassical growth model, the diminishing
returns to capital accumulation play an analogous role.
The monotonic increase of N and monotonic decline of N/N imply a monotonic
decline of C /C in accordance with equation (26). Equation (20) therefore implies that
2 2
r 2 is monotonically decreasing; it falls steadily toward its steady-state value, r .
1
Since country 2's per-worker product, y , is proportional to N (equation [14]),
2
2
the growth rat~ of y exceeds -r during the transition, but falls gradually toward -y .
1
2
1
Thus, the model exhibits the familiar convergence pattern in which the follower
country's per-worker output grows faster than that of the leader, but the differential in
the growth rates diminishes the more the follower catches up.
As mentioned before, the follower's per-worker output, y , is likely to fall short of
2
the leader's, yl' in the steady state; that is, (y /y )*<1. Equations (16) and (25) imply
2 1
that (y /y )* is an increasing function of A / A and L /L and a decreasing function of
2 1
2 1
2 1
112! 111·

IV. Constant (or Slowly Rising) Costs of Imitation

The type of equilibrium discussed thus far depends on the assumption that the
this case.
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A

imitation cost,

, rises to a sufficient degree as N increases. Specifically, in Figure 1,
2

11

*

A

the condition is that 11 rise above 11 for N:N /N < 1. (The property that 11
2
2
2 1
2
approaches T/ as N /N approaches 1 is not important here.) Figure 4 deals with an
2 1
2
alternative case in which 11 is constant and low, so that 11 <11*. The analysis would be
2 2
2
similar if 11 were instead slowly rising, so that 11 approaches (from the left) a value
2
2
*
below 112 as N2/N 1 approaches 1.
Intuitively, if 11 is small (in particular, below 11*), then the imitation process will
2
2
carry on at a sufficient pace to exhaust eventually all of the available products
discovered in country 1. That is, N=l will be reached at some finite date T. At this
point, there will be an excess supply of persons willing to pay 11 to copy one of
2
country 1's discoveries, which continue to flow in at the rate 1 . Somehow, this excess
1
supply has to be eliminated in the equilibrium. Moreover, for t<T, where N<l, agents
in country 2 realize that a state of excess supply will arise later, and their previous
choices of rates of imitation must be consistent with this expectation.

A. The Steady State

It is easiest to begin at the end; that is, when t>T, so that N=l has already been
attained. In this case, the natural conjecture from the previous analysis is that
country 2 would be in a steady state in which N grows at the rate 'Yl' the growth rate
2
of N1 , so that N= 1 applies forever. In this situation, the goods discovered in country 1
are immediately copied for use in country 2. Also,

c2 grows at the rate 1 1, so that

x2:C 2/N 2 remains fixed over time.
Suppose, however, that r 2 equals 1r2/11 , the value implied by equation (19) when
2
12
11 is constant. In this case, r >r applies.
But r 2>r 1 implies that c would grow
2 1
2
2
faster than 'Yl' the growth rate of c 1, so that country 2 would not be in a steady state.

*

that r 1=1r1/TJ 1 and 112<112 in Figure 4. The result r >r follows from the expression
2 1
*
for 112 in equation (22).
12Recall
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The problem is that making copies at the low cost v is too good a deal to be consistent
2
with the growth of c and N at the steady-state rate, 1 . If the rate of return were
2
2
1
1r / v , then agents in country 2 would want to devote enough resources to copying so
2 2
that N2 would grow at a rate faster than 1 . But, since new goods are discovered only
1
at the rate 'Yl' there is insufficient copiable material available to support imitation at
this fast a rate. Somehow the rate of return in country 2 must be bid down to r to
1
support the allocations that arise in the steady state.
If N2=N 1 and imitators in country 2 expend the flow of resources v 1 N , then N
2 1 1
2
would grow along with N at the constant rate 1 . However, if each individual in
1
1

country 2 thinks that he can copy a good just by paying v , then the amount spent on
2
copying would exceed v 1 N ; that is, there would be excess demand for goods to be
2 1 1
copied. We suppose in this excess-demand situation that the monopoly rights to the
copied goods in country 2 are allocated in a random manner. Specifically, we assume
that each person's probability of obtaining the property right is proportional to the
amount spent on copying effort. In equilibrium, the total flow of resources expended by
potential imitators must then be v*-y Nl' where v*>v is the cost per good that drives
2 1
2 2
the expected rate of return down to r (see equations [21] and [22] and Figure 4). 13 This
1
bidding up of the effective cost of copying to v* deters any further entry of potential
2
imitators.
In the steady state, the effective cost of copying is v*>v , and the expected rate of
2 2
return to imitation is r . This rate of return is consistent with growth of c and N at
1
2
2
the steady-state rate, 1 . The steady-state solution is therefore the same as that shown
1
in Figure 1, except that (N /N )*=1 applies. (We continue to assume that 11 >v*, as
2 1
2 2
shown in Figure 4; that is, the inequality in [23] holds.)

13 This result holds if the risk involved in imitation
success is diversifiable, so that potential
imitators consider only the expectation of the return.
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B. Transitional Dynamics

Consider now the situation when t<T, so that N2<N 1, and the copiable products
are in plentiful supply. The rate of return in country 2 must then be

{30)

which is constant. The growth rate of consumption is therefore also constant and given
by

(31)

This result corresponds to equation (26) with o-=0.14
A

A

The formula for N/N is the same as equation (27) and that for x 2/x2 is the same
as equation (29) with u set to zero:

where x 2:C 2/N 2.
Equations (27) and (32) and be used, as before, to construct a phase diagram in
A

(N,x ) space. Figure 5 shows the resulting diagram. Note that each locus is now a
2
A

horizontal line. We can show readily (if 1r2/v2 > r 1) that the N=0 locus lies above the

equation (24), u=O implies that v2 is independent of N 2/N 1. However, in the present
case, v2<'T/2 also applies.
14In
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x2=0 locus, as shown in the figure.

We also have that N is falling for values above the

N=O locus and rising for values below it, whereas x is rising for values above the x =0
2
2
locus and falling for values below it. These patterns imply that the stable, saddle path
begins between the two horizontal loci and is then upward sloping. We have drawn the
A

path so that it remains below the N=O locus when N reaches 1, a configuration that is
implied by the subsequent analysis.
Figure 5 implies a transition in which N and

x2 increase monotonically.

The rise

in N means that N /N exceeds , along the path. The expansion of x implies from
2 2
1
2
equation (27) that N /N declines steadily. Thus, the solution accords with the
2 2
previous one in predicting that the follower grows faster (in terms of number of known
products and output) than the leader, but the gap in the growth rates diminishes as the
follower catches up. Note, however, that

c 2/c 2 is constant at a value that exceeds , 1

(see equation [31]).
The tricky part of the solution concerns the behavior just at time T, when N
reaches 1. Just to the right of this point, imitations effectively cost v*>v , and the rate
2 2
of return is r . Just to the left of this point, imitations cost v , and the rate of return
1
2
(from equation [30]) is 1r /v > r . Anyone who pays v to imitate a good just before
2 2
1
2
date Twill, in the next instant, experience a sharp capital gain corresponding to the
increase in the shadow price of an imitated product from v to v*. In fact, the rate of
2
2
return to copying a good is infinite for an instant of time at date T. This curious
behavior for the instantaneous rate of return supports the equilibrium for quantities
when the cost of copying is small and constant.
Figure 6 shows the full path of the equilibrium for country 2's rate of return, r ,
2
and log of consumption, log(C ). To the left of date T, the rate of return is constant at
2
1r2 /v2 , and the slope of log(C 2) is the associated constant, (l/8)·(1r /v -p). To the
2 2
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right of date T, the rate of return is constant at the lower value, r 1=1r1/T/1' and the
slope oflog(C ) is the correspondingly smaller value, (l/0)•(1r1/T/1 -p). At time T, the
2
infinite rate of return (for an instant of time) supports a jump in the level of log(C 2).
This jump is consistent with the economy's overall resource constraint, because the
amount expended on imitation jumps downward at the same time by an equal amount. 15
Note that there is no jump at time T (or any other time) in the level of total output.
Suppose now that v were slowly rising, rather than constant, but that the value of
2
*
v at N=1 remains below v2. In this case, the behavior at time T still involves an
2
infinite rate of return and a jump in the level of consumption. The main new results are
A

that r will fall steadily for t<T, and the growth rate of c2 will therefore also decline in
2
this range.
The bottom line is that cases of constant or slowly rising imitation costs agree
qualitatively with the model from the previous section in the predictions about the
follower's growth rates. In each case, a lower value of N 2/N 1 implies a higher growth
rate of N2 and, hence, of Y2. This property extends also to the growth rate of c 2,
except for the case in which the imitation cost, v2 , does not rise at all until N2 reaches
N1 at date T.

15The

change in the resources devoted to imitation involves two offsetting effects. First, the
resource use falls because the growth rate of N2 declines by a discrete amount. Second, the
resource use rises because each unit now costs v*>v . In the equilibrium (which involves
2

.

,

2

an infinite rate of return at date T and, hence, an upward jump in consumption), the net
effect must be a reduction in resource use for imitation. Also, the stable, shadow path

t

shown in Figure 5 must remain below the N=O locus at date Tin order to be consistent
A

with the downward jump in N and the upward jump in x2 at date T. (The loci for N=O
and x2=0 shift after date T--downward and upward, respectively-because v is replaced
2
*
in the equations by the higher value v2.)

23

V. General Implications for Growth Rates in Follower Countries
The various models considered imply that the growth rate of output per worker in
country 2 can be written in the form

(33)

where the partial derivatives of the function G satisfy G1<0 and G2>0, and G( •, • )=0
when y2/y 1=(y2/y 1)*. Growth rates do not necessarily exhibit absolute convergence, in
the sense described by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 1), because y2/y 2<'Y1 can
apply if y2/y 1<L If (y2/y 1)* is small-for example, because A2/A 1 is low-then
y2/y 2 can be below 'Yl even if y2 is substantially less than y1. Country 2's growth rate,

The results exhibit conditional convergence, in the sense that y2/y 2 rises as y2/y 1
falls for a given value of (y2/y 1)*. Also, for given y2/yl' y2/y 2 rises with (y 2/y 1)*.
For example, if the government of country 2 adopts policies that are more favorable to
production and investment-such as lower tax rates or more effective enforcement of
property rights-then the change amounts to an increase in A2. Hence, (y /y )*
2 1
increases, and the growth rate, y2/y 2, rises.
In the neoclassical growth model with labor-augmenting technological progress, as
described in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Ch. 2), the formula for the growth rate of
per capita output in a closed economy looks similar to equation (33). The differences
are that 'Yl is replaced by the rate of exogenous technical change, denoted by x; y /y is
2 1
replaced by y, the country's output per effective worker (a concept that takes account of
A

the growth at rate x because of technological progress); and (y2 /y )* is replaced by y*,
1
the steady-state level of output per effective worker. Thus, the growth formula in the
standard model can be written as
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(34)

y/y

= X + H(y, y*),

where the partial derivatives of the function H satisfy H1<0 and H2 >0, and H( •, • )=0
,.
when y=y*. The value y* depends on elements included in the parameter A, such as
,.

government policies, and on the willingness to save. Higher values of A raise y*,
,.

whereas higher values of the preference parameters, p and 0, reduce y*.
One distinction between the two classes of models is that the intercept in equation
(33) is "Yp the growth rate of the leading economy (or economies), whereas that in
equation (34) is x, the constant rate of exogenous technological progress. Operationally,
11 might be identified with the average growth rate of output per worker in a set of

advanced countries. 16 The parameter x would not be directly observable and might vary
over time or across countries.

If all followers have the same leaders-because the costs of imitation, vi, are the
same in all cases-and if the rates of exogenous technical change are the same for all
countries at a given point in time, then both models imply that the intercept is the same
for all countries. In a single cross section, equation (33) would constrain the intercept to
equal the observable value "Yp whereas equation (34) would not impose this constraint.
Thus, the diffusion model would, in this respect, amount to a restricted version of the
neoclassical growth model.
In a panel setting, equation (33) would allow the intercept to vary over time, but
only in line with the observable changes in 11. Equation (34) would fix the intercept,
but only if we retain the version of the neoclassical growth model in which the rate of

are influenced by the growth of N1, not by the growth of the leader's output per
worker, y 1, although the two growth rates coincide in the present model. In a setting that
allows for short-term fluctuations of y 1 for given N1, the growth rate of N 1 would likely be
better estimated by a long-term average of the growth rate of y1, rather than the current
growth rate. Direct measures of N1 would not generally be available, although patents or
cumulated R&D spending would be possibilities.
16 Followers
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technological progress, x, is constant (as well as the same for all countries). H the rate
of technical change is exogenous, but not necessarily constant, then equation (34) would
allow the intercept to vary over time in an unconstrained manner. In this case, the
diffusion model would again amount to a constrained version of the neoclassical growth
model.
With respect to the terms G( •) and H( •),the key aspect of equation {33) is that
the growth rate depends on a country's characteristics expressed relative to those in the
leading economy (or economies), whereas equation (34) involves the absolute levels of
these characteristics. Suppose, for example, that the growth rate, 'Yl' in the United
States-the representation of the technological leader-is 2% per year. Equation {33)
says that, for given 'Yl' the growth rate of a typical follower, say Mexico, depends on the
quality of its political and economic institutions (determinants of the parameter A.)
1
expressed relative to those in the United States. Equation (34) says that the
characteristics of Mexican institutions matter for Mexican growth, but it is not
necessary to condition these characteristics on the comparable attributes of the United
States.
If all countries have the same leader, then, in a single cross section, the leader's

characteristics merge into the overall intercept. In a panel context, changes in the
leader's characteristics shift the intercept over time. The problem, however, is that the
intercept can shift for other reasons. For example, in the neoclassical growth model,
variations in the world rate of exogenous technological progress would be a source of
these shifts.
Clear empirical distinctions between the diffusion model and the standard
neoclassical growth model arise if countries differ in terms of their relevant leaders, for
example, because the cost of imitation, vi' depends on physical distance or on the
degrees of similarity in language or culture. In a cross section of countries, the growth
rate 'Yi then depends on country i's characteristics expressed in relation to those of a set
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of potential leaders. The characteristics of these leaders would be weighted in
accordance with measures, such as distance, that proxy for the cost, vi' of adapting
technology. Results of Chua (1993) and Easterly and Levine (1994) on the growth
effects of neighboring countries relate to this idea, although these studies focus on
influences from physically adjacent places.

VI. Switchovers of Technological Leadership
We have considered thus far the case in which
(A /A )1/(l-a).(L /L )-(17 /17 )<1, so that country 2 is intrinsically inferior to
2 1
2 1
1 2
country 1 in terms of the underlying parameters. This inequality guarantees in
Figures 1 and 4 that v* lies below 17 on the vertical axis. For this reason, agents in
2
2
country 2 never wish to innovate.
Suppose now that the inequality is reversed,

(35)

so that country 2 is intrinsically superior to country 1. Since N (0)<N (o) still applies,
2
1
country 2 again begins in a technologically inferior state. This situation would arise if,
for example, country 2 had been inferior to country 1 for a long time, but a recent
improvement in government policy-say an increase in A relative to A -made
2
1
country 2 intrinsically superior.
Return now to the case shown in Figure 1 in which v rises with N /N and
2
2 1
approaches 172 as N2/N approaches 1. The inequality in (35) implies, however, that the
1
*
value v2 given in equation (22) now exceeds 17 . Thus, Figure 7 shows that N /N
2
2 1
reaches unity and correspondingly v reaches 1'/ at a point where the cost of increasing
2
2
N2 is still below v*. This result means that agents in country 2 find it advantageous to
2

..•

I
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raise N /N above unity by innovating at the cost ,, . Thus, once all of country l's
2 1
2
discoveries have been copied, country 2 switches to innovation.
The inventions in country 2 create a pool of products that can be imitated by
country 1. Since the cost of copying is lower than ,, , agents in country 1 now find
1
imitation preferable to invention. Country 1's role shifts accordingly from leader to
follower. 11 Note that country 1's welfare will be enhanced by the presence of the
technologically superior country 2.1s
The initial model applies after the switchover with the roles reversed: country 2 is
now the permanent technological leader, and country 1 is the permanent follower.
Country 2's rate of return, r , and growth rate, 1 (of N , Y , and C ), are constant
2
2 2
2
2
after the switchover. The values of r and 1 are given, respectively, by equations (8)
2
2
and (11) if the subscripts in the formulas are changed from 1 to 2. The steady-state
ratio of numbers of products, (N /N )*, is still given by equation (25), but now exceeds
2 1
unity.
Figures 2 and 3 describe the post-switchover dynamics for country 1 if N now
A

equals N1/N 2 and x1 replaces x . The only difference from before is that N starts at
2
unity, a value to the right of N*. The dynamic path therefore features steadily declining
A

A

values of N and x1:C 1/N . The steady fall in N means that country 2 continues to
1
grow faster than country 1 during the post-switchover transition. As N falls, the cost,
A

vl' for imitation in country 1 declines, and the rate of return and growth rates in

171n the specification where viN /N ) approaches¾ as N /N approaches 1 (as in
2 1
2 1
Figures 1 and 7), country 1 switches all at once from leader to follower, and country 2
moves all at once from follower to leader. The switchover involves a transition with
mixing of innovation and imitation within a country if v (N /N ) rises above 77 before
2 2 1
2
N2/N 1 reaches 1. (An analogous cost function for imitation would apply to country 1.) In
this revised formulation, country 2 would switch at some point from pure imitation to a
mixture of imitation and innovation. Then, after a finite stock of country 2's discoveries
had built up, the cost of imitation by country 1 would become low enough so that
country 1 would shift to a mixture of imitation and innovation. Eventually, country 2
would move fully out of imitation, and country 1 would move fully out of innovation.
18 Since final product is physically homogeneous, there is no possibility in this model of an
adverse relative-price effect for country 1 because of the rise in productivity in country 2.

28

country 1 increase. In the steady state, country 1's rate of return reaches r , a constant,
2
and its growth rate (of Nl' Y1' and c ) reaches -r , also a constant. 19
1
2
The switch of technological leadership can occur only once in the model if the
underlying parameters A., L., and 'f'/· do not change. The switch occurs if the country
l
l
l
that starts with the relatively low number of known products, Ni, is intrinsically
superior in the sense of the inequality in (35). Thus, the present framework differs from
models of leapfrogging, as explored by Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993) and
Ohyama and Jones (1993). In those settings, the changes in technological leadership
reflect the effects of backwardness on the willingness to explore and adopt radically new
ideas. In the present model, the countries that start out behind have a benefit from low
costs of imitation, but have no advantages with respect to the discovery or
implementat ion of leading-edge technologies.
In practice, the parameters Ai' Li, and 7Ji would change over time; for example,
because of shifts in government policies. These movements would occasionally create
changes in the positions of technological leadership. (These changes would be lagged
substantially from the shifts in the underlying parameters.) However, since
backwardness does not enhance the discovery or implementation of new technologies and
since the leaders are selected for the favorable values of their underlying parameters,
there would be no tendency for a particular follower eventually to surpass a particular
leader. In contrast, the probability that a leader would eventually be overtaken by some
follower would likely be high.
These results seem consistent with the broad patterns of change in world
technological leadership that are highlighted by Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon (1993).

19 The

final possibility is that the parameter combination A. l/(l-o)L.17. is the same for the
l
l l
two countries. In this case, the equilibrium can be of the first type (where country 1 is the
permanent leader and country 2 the permanent follower) or of the second type (where the
leadership positions change). There could also be a mixture of invention and imitation in
the two places. In the steady state, agents in both countries are indifferent between
innovation and imitation.
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They argue that Great Britain overtook the Netherlands as leader in the 1700s, the
United States (and, in some respects, Germany) overtook Great Britain by the late
1800s, and Japan surpassed the United States in some sectors in recent years. The
striking aspect of this pattern is not that changes in technological leadership occur, but
rather that the positions at the top persist for so long. In particular, most countries
have never been technological leaders. The empirical evidence therefore does not
suggest any great benefits from backwardness, per se, in the discovery and use of the
newest technologies.

Vll. Welfare Considerations
Consider the model described in Figure 1 in which country 1 is always the
technological leader, country 2 is always the follower, and the cost of imitation is
increasing in N /N . One source of distortion in this model involves the monopoly
2 1
pricing of the intermediates that have already been discovered in country 1 or imitated
in country 2. This element is familiar from the models of Romer (1990), Rivera-B atiz
and Romer (1991), and Barro and Sala-i-M artin (1995, Ch. 6). From a static
perspective, the distortio n reflects the excess of the price paid for each intermediate,
1/ a, over the marginal cost of production, 1. This wedge can be eliminated by using a
lump-sum tax in each country to subsidize purchases of intermediates at the rate
(1-a)/ a. Each user of an intermediate then faces a net price of one, the marginal cost
of production.20
Another distortion in the present framework is that agents in country 1 have
insufficient incentive to innovate because they do not take account of the benefit to
20in a one-country version of the present model, this subsidy to the purchase of intermed iates
would be sufficient to achieve a Pareto optimum because a new invention does not affect
the rentals of the existing monopolists. In other models, such as Aghion and Howitt (1992)
and Barro and Sala-i-M artin (1995, Ch. 7), inventions destroy the rentals of the existing
technological leaders. This element tends to make the privately chosen growth rate too
high. The achievement of a Pareto optimum then requires an additional intervention, such
as a tax on R&D. In Romer (1990), R&D has direct spillover benefits, so that a Pareto
optimum necessitates a subsidy to R&D.
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country 2 from an increase in the pool of copiable ideas. This effect would be
internalized if each innovator in country 1 retained the international property rights
over the use of his or her idea. In one setting, the inventor would subsequently adapt
the intermediate for use in country 2. The initial R&D decision then considers the
world market, which consists here of a combination of countries 1 and 2. The
corresponding lumJHum cost of acquisition is the invention cost, ,., , plus the expense for
1
adaptation of the discovery to country 2. (In some cases, adaptation will be too
expensive to be worthwhile, and the results will be the same as those derived earlier for
country 1.)
The innovator's adaptation of a new product to another country amounts to
technology transfer through foreign direct investment. The results would be equivalent
if an inventor from country 1 licensed the idea to an entrepreneur in country 2. In
either case, the guarantee of intellectual property rights motivates researchers to
consider the worldwide benefits of their inventions.
Another distortion arises in the model because agents in country 2 do not consider
that the imitation of one of country 1's ideas raises the cost that will apply to future
imitations. To isolate this effect, suppose that N grows at the given rate 1 and that
1
1
the effect from monopoly pricing in country 2 has been neutralized by a subsidy at the
rate (1-o)/ o on the use of intermediates. This subsidy, financed by a lump-sum tax,
implies that the net price of intermediates to users is one, the marginal cost of
production. We can then compare the outcomes of a decentralized solution with those
that would be determined by a social planner in country 2.
The social planner seeks to maximize the utility of the representative consumer in
country 2, subject to the production function in equation (1); the specification of the
cost of copying v , assumed to be given by equation (24); and the growth rate of N at
2
1
the given rate 1 . The optimal quantity of each intermediate, X , maximizes output,
1
2
Y , net of the outlay on intermediates, and is given by
2
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(36)

The usual conditions for dynamic optimization lead to the following expressions for
the growth rates of N and C :
2
2

(37)

(38)

(39)

In a decentralized situation in which purchases of intermediates are subsidized at the
rate (1-o:)/ o:, 'IJ1 turns out to equal the profit flow,
for

2. (This amount exceeds the value

1r

2 shown in equation [15].)
For the decentralized setting, the subsidy on purchases of intermediates implies

1r

that

x2 equals the social-planner's choice shown in equation (36).

Since the values of

x2 are equal, the decentralized path for N2 would coincide with the planner's path if the
choices of x were the same. That is, the formula that determines N /N in the
2
2 2
decentralized case is the same as equation (37). Differences in results arise only because
of differences in the choices of consumption.
The growth rate of consumption in the decentralized solution turns out to be
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This expression differs from the social-planner's result in equation (38) only by the term
that involves

w-x2. It is possible to show that W>x2applies in the steady state.

Moreover, since

x2 can be shown to be monotonically increasing during the transition

(from the type of phase-diagram analysis used before),

w-x2must be positive

.

throughout. It follows that the decentralized choice of c /c is greater than the
2 2
social-planner's value at all values of N /N (and, hence, 11 ). In other words, the
2
2 1
decentralized solution involves lower levels of x and higher growth rates of c .
2
2

Equation (37) then implies that the decentralized choice of N /N is greater than the
2 2
social-planner's choice at each value of N /N . This result implies that the steady
2 1
state value of N2/N 1 in the decentralized solution exceeds the steady-state value chosen
by the social planner.21
The growth rate is too high in the decentralized solution because the allocation of
resources to imitation (and, hence, growth) is analogous to increased fishing in a
congestible pond. Specifically, an agent that expends 11 (N /N ) to raise N does not
2 2 1
2
consider that this action will raise the cost faced by future imitators of products.
Viewed alternatively, private agents count the capital gain,

11 /11

2 2

, as part of the return

to imitation, whereas this element does not enter into the social return. This kind of
distortion would not arise if potential imitators in country 2 were somehow assigned
well-defined property rights at the outset to the goods that could be copied from
country 1. Alternatively, the distortion would not arise if the inventors in country 1
possessed these rights of adaptation to country 2.
We can make analogous welfare comparisons for the case discussed in section IV in
which 112 is low and constant. In the steady state, the social planner's and decentralized
solutions each feature N2 /N 1=1 with N2 and c growing at the rate -y . However, in
2
1
the decentralized case, the competition among potential copiers drives the effective cost
21The parameters are assumed to be such that N /N remains below unity in the steady
2 1
state.
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of imitation up to v*>v . This waste of resources implies that the steady-state level of
2 2
x2:.C 2/N 2 is lower than in the social planner 1s setting. (This result holds even if the
decentralized solution involves the appropriate subsidy for the use of intermediates in
country 2.)
Recall that, when N =N was attained at time Tin the decentralized case,
2 1
jumped upward, and the resources devoted to copying jumped downward

c2

correspondingly. We can show that the solution for the social planner in country 2
entails no such jumps. The growth rate of c falls discretely at time T, but the level of
2
c2-a.nd, hence, the amount of resources spent on copying-do not jump.
For t<T, we can shown that the decentralized choice for N /N exceeds the social
2 2
planner's value. (This result holds if the decentralized solution involves the appropriate
subsidy on the use of intermediates in country 2.) The values for C /c are the same
2 2
(and constant) in the two environments, but the decentralized path features lower levels
of x2:C2/N 2 and correspondingly higher levels of resources devoted to copying, v N .
2 2
Again, the problem is the excessive incentive to secure property rights in the
follower country. In the model with smoothly rising costs of copying, v , this incentive
2
is communicated by a stream of capital gains to holders of monopoly rights in country 2.
In the model with constant v , the inducement comes from the prospect of an infinite
2
rate of capital gain for an instant at time T. Either way, the capital gains motivate
imitation at too fast a rate.

VITI. Concluding Observations
Our analysis of invention and imitation combines features of endogenous-growth
models with the convergence implications of the neoclassical growth model. In the long
run, the world's growth rate is driven by discoveries in the technologically leading
economies. Followers converge at least part way toward the leaders because copying is
cheaper than innovation over some range. As the pool of uncopied ideas diminishes, the

I •
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cost of imitation tends to increase, and the followers' growth rates tend accordingly to
decline. Therefore, the results exhibit a form of conditional convergence, a property
found in the cross-country data on economic growth.
The outcomes deviate from Pareto optimality for reasons that involve the
publicness of discoveries, imperfect competition, and limited specification of property
rights. We stress the consequences from the absence of intellectual property rights
across economies. In this context, the leading places tend to have insufficient incentive
to invent, and the follower places tend to have excessive incentive to copy.
In the long run, the identities of the technological leaders and followers are also
endogenous. In the present model, the private reward from innovation depends on its
complementarity with domestic production possibilities. (It is not possible to invent
things and retain control over their use in other places.) Therefore, the technological
leader is selected in the long run in accordance with the attractiveness of the local
environment for production and research (high parameter A.1 and low parameter f'/·)
and
1
with the scale of complementary domestic inputs (high Li). We suggest that
government policies on security of property rights, taxation, and infrastructure are
ultimately key determinants of an area's attractiveness for production and research (the
parameters Ai and

11/

However, our analysis takes these government policies as

exogenous, because we lack a theory about the convergence or divergence of government
policies across countries or regions.
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